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Virtus and the Roman World: Generality, 
Specificity, and Fluidity 
By 
Kyle Schrader 
~      ~ 
 
I. Introduction 
 Scholars frequently debate the meanings of classical words 
that do not necessarily have direct modern language parallels. 
Words like the Greek othismos and the Latin virtus are poorly 
understood, and modern scholars strive to provide these words 
with specific definitions. The Romans saw their virtus, a term often 
inadequately translated as the English word “virtue,” as a major 
factor in their conquest of the Mediterranean. In this context, the 
Romans focused on their military virtus, a term that includes 
numerous intricacies of Roman combat ideology but can be 
simplified by the translation “martial courage.” However, the 
Romans also used virtus to describe men, women and objects off 
the battlefield, and in these cases virtus can also exhibit the 
adjectival qualities of the English word “excellence.” 
 These two uses of the term virtus are oversimplifications 
though. Donald Earl presented virtus as a word defining a 
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multitude of complex physical and moral ideas and practices.123 
While many more modern scholars oppose Earl’s view, it is clear 
that the term virtus does not necessarily define anything specific. 
Instead, the context gives virtus its meaning. The multitude of 
times virtus appears in the Latin lexicon, as well as the numerous 
different connotations and situations the word is found in, suggest 
a more broad usage of the term than modern scholars care to 
admit.124 From the literary sources available, three primary uses of 
virtus appear: a more general one meaning “excellence,” and two 
more specific meanings revolving around the battlefield and 
aristocratic competition in the Roman Republic. 
 
II. Virtus as a General Term  
Virtus was often used in military histories, accounts, and 
other such documents to describe a soldier or general’s actions on 
and recently off the battlefield. Virtus is also frequently found in 
poetry, theatre, and philosophical writings. One of the most famous 
of the non-military uses of the word virtus is in Cato’s De 
Agricultura, where Cato claims that the best land has natural 
virtus.125 Some scholars contribute this usage of virtus to Greek 
                                                          
123 Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), 20. 
124 Myles McDonnell, Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5. 
125 Cato, De Agricultura, (Harvard: Loeb Classical Library, 1934), Book I, 
Chapter I, 3. 
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influence over the Latin vocabulary. 126  If this was true, virtus 
should have lost, or at least changed, its original, more military 
meanings based on Greek influence as well, which, with evidence 
from later and contemporary military documents, is certainly not 
the case. Myles McDonnell, a modern proponent of the Greek-
influence theory, suggests that all uses of virtus in Roman plays are 
simply mis-translated versions of the Greek term for excellence, 
ἀῥἐῐᾐ. 127  Further, the other uses of virtus in this way (such as 
Cato’s usage in De Agricultura), according to McDonnell, can be 
attributed to a similar blending of the two different words that may 
have occurred during the Pyrrhic War.128 McDonnell uses these 
arguments to attempt to explain away these general uses of virtus, 
and yet, even if the linguistic blending did occur, these uses still 
existed. 
There is another possibility to explain these usages of 
virtus: perhaps these Roman writers were simply speaking 
metaphorically or with a sort of hyperbole. Classical scholars often 
see the word virtus and assume it is being used literally; in 
comedic theatre it is more likely the word would have been used 
ironically, and in other writings, such as Cato’s, the word virtus 
may have appeared so that a more general audience could 
understand the meaning. Ancient sources cannot always be 
                                                          
126 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 73. 
127 Ibid., 107. 
128 Ibid., 77. 
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translated verbatim, no more than any modern languages can be 
translated fully into another language due to metaphors, 
euphemisms, idioms, and other cultural and linguistic tools. 
The Roman comedies of Plautus frequently use virtus in 
both military and non-military contexts. In Plautus’ Asinaria, a 
slave recounts his own virtus involved in his acceptance of his 
position in life, including his courage in enduring his master’s 
beatings.129 Modern scholars, such as Myles McDonnell, tend to 
argue that this instance is parody, and that a slave with virtus 
would have been a humorous concept to the Roman audiences of 
Plautus.130 However, the Romans themselves would have also seen 
the slave in question as exemplary, a slave who accepted his place 
under his master was preferred to one who rebelled or disdained 
his job. 131  In that context, virtus could be used to define an 
exemplary, or “excellent,” slave, and so maintain the general 
meaning of “excellence.” 
Another example of a somewhat odd usage of virtus comes 
from a later source: Cicero. While Plautus sometimes gave women 
the descriptor of virtus, Cicero is better known for describing his 
own wife’s virtus.132 Myles McDonnell mentions this instance as 
well, but simply glosses over it as a late Republican conception of 
                                                          
129 C. Stace, “The Slaves of Plautus,” Greece and Rome 15, No. 1 (1968): 68. 
130 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 24. 
131 Roberta Stewart, Plautus and Roman Slavery (London: Blackwell Publishing, 
2012), 26. 
132 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 169. 
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the word. Plautus’ use of virtus to describe clever women, as well 
as Cicero’s wife’s virtus of excellence and competence as a wife 
and mother, show a continuity of the usage of the word from the 
middle Republic to the late Republic in that specific context. 
Regardless of the linguistic origins of virtus being utilized 
in this general way, it appears frequently enough that the general 
meaning has to be a part of the overall definition of virtus. There 
are so many examples of land having virtus, women having virtus, 
slaves having virtus, and other non-Roman-male’s having virtus 
that a less specific meaning of virtus had to have existed in the 
Roman vernacular, and therefore in Roman writing. 
 
III. Battlefield Virtus 
 Jeremiah McCall, a modern scholar with an emphasis on 
the Roman aristocracy and military, claims that “virtus could only 
be demonstrated on the battlefield.” 133  While the term “only” 
certainly raises contention, the Romans did frequently use virtus 
used as a battlefield term. McCall discusses the role of the 
aristocratic cavalry in the army of the Republic and how each 
member of a cavalry unit was expected to exhibit virtus.134 This 
specific virtus included the ideals of martial courage, single 
combat, and other ideas based on one’s position on the battlefield 
                                                          
133 Jeremiah McCall, The Cavalry of the Roman Republic (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 83. 
134 Ibid, 83. 
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and Roman social hierarchy. 
 For the rank and file soldiers, virtus meant courage. These 
classical warriors may have believed courage was based on the 
ideals of “single combat,” or dueling, as J.E. Lendon argues.135 
These virtues would have been inherited from the classical stories 
in the Illiad and Odyssey, two Greek stories, along with older Latin 
tales. The Romans frequently translated and told the story of 
Othryades, the Spartan warrior who stayed on the battlefield even 
after all of his comrades had perished, and claimed victory as the 
two remaining Argive soldiers retreated to inform Argos of their 
victory.136 This story involved the champions of Sparta and Argos 
in combat with one another, with the Spartan Othryades continuing 
to fight and stay on the battlefield despite the loss of his unit and 
his own sustained wounds. This act of bravery would have inspired 
many Roman soldiers to emulate such acts in their own military 
careers. 
 Nathan Rosenstein takes the Greek connection further, 
arguing that, instead of emulating the Illiad, the Roman soldiers 
saw virtus as a code similar to the Spartan’s own military 
                                                          
135 J. E. Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity 
(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 2005), 174. 
136 E. H. Warmington trans., Remains of Old Latin, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1935), 78. 
Besides the cited reference, this story is also mentioned by Livy, Cicero, and 
Seutonius, meaning it was a well-known story at least by the end of the 
Republic. 
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tradition.137 This code included the sacred duty “not to flee” battle 
and to hold formation.138 Rosenstein suggests the Romans would 
have adopted this code from early experiences with the Greek city-
states in southern Italy, and to an even larger extent from 
emulation of Pyrrhus during the Pyrrhic War.139 This explanation 
of virtus would further explain why the story of Othryades was so 
popular among the Romans. The Roman manipular formation, 
however, leant itself far more to a mobile and flexible style of 
combat, meaning the rigid formation code of the Spartans would 
not have worked well when integrated into that battle formation. 
 Lendon extrapolates the single-combat aspect of virtus in 
soldiers to the formation the Romans adopted in the middle 
Republic.140 The traditional explanation for the Roman maniple is 
that they abandoned the phalanx in favor of a looser, more flexible 
formation in order to fight the Samnites and other peoples in Italy. 
Lendon, however, argues that the ideal of virtus, his definition 
focusing on single combat and competition, lent itself to a looser 
formation in which individual soldiers could have their duels with 
opposing soldiers.141 This is an interesting argument, and one that 
is not in conflict with the definition of Roman soldiers’ battlefield 
                                                          
137 Nathan S Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocractic 
Competition in the Middle and Late Republic (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 96. 
138 Ibid, 96. 
139 Ibid, 97. 
140 Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts, 182. 
141 Ibid., 185. 
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virtus. Each individual soldier sought their own glory in their 
service to the Roman state, and the Roman maniple provided them 
an excellent outlet to show off their military prowess to their 
comrades, fostering competition and brotherhood as well.142 
 The aristocratic elements of the Roman army viewed virtus 
differently from their lower-class compatriots. Though single-
combat was also a major factor in their battlefield virtus, the 
aristocracy did this specifically because they wished to acquire 
spolia opima, or “noble spoils.”143 These spoils would be stripped 
off an enemy that they had slain, generally an aristocrat of the 
opposing side. In addition to the spolia opima, pure exhibitions of 
courage, such as putting oneself in more danger than the call of 
duty would require, could be rewarded with military accolades.144 
Either of these, the spolia opima or a military award, would launch 
an aristocrat’s political career forward, and enable them to begin 
the long ascension in political offices known as the cursus 
honorum.145 
 
IV. Virtus and the Aristocracy 
 A Roman aristocrat aspired to ascend to a political or 
military position wherein they would be awarded imperium, or the 
                                                          
142 Ibid., 186. 
143 Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts, 175. 
144 McCall, The Cavalry, 84. 
145 Andrew Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 45. 
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right to command troops. These positions included the praetors, 
consuls and dictators, though the dictatorship was never actively 
sought by Republican aristocrats until the end of the Republic, as it 
only served as an emergency position. 146  In numerous Latin 
accounts from Livy, Cicero, Cato, and others, men who had 
obtained imperium via the cursus honorum automatically had 
virtus. Cicero specifically stated that a man with imperium had 
“singular virtus.”147 This commonality between accounts suggests 
that virtus was not necessarily a moral trait achieved by great men, 
but an omnipresent trait intrinsic in great men who obtained the 
highest powers and honors in Roman society. The specifics of this 
trait changed throughout Roman history on the basis of who the 
top men in the Republic were and how they achieved their 
victories on and off the battlefield. 
 Aristocratic males were born under their pater familias, the 
head of the family who was usually the oldest male, and were 
actually owned by him until either his death or their entrance into 
Roman public life. The aristocratic pater familias was generally a 
successful patrician, and often a senator who had done his military 
service and at least part of the cursus honorum to earn himself a 
seat in the Senate upon his retirement. A pater familias’s primary 
duty to their male children was to provide them education and an 
                                                          
146 Ibid., 25. 
147 M. Tullius Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, translated by C. 
D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden, 1856), 2. 
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entrance into public life; this training would have included military 
exercises and moral behavior lessons. The indoctrination of Roman 
patriotism and virtus began at a very young age.148 
 Once in the military, an aristocrat would either join the 
cavalry (if his family had a certain amount of wealth) or become 
captain for one of the infantry maniples. Once on the battlefield, 
the aristocrat could search for his single combat or great act of 
bravery to get himself noticed by their commanders and the 
Senate. Once the battlefield virtus had been established by 
achieving one of these two goals (or simply through longevity of 
decent military service), public office was assured for that 
aristocrat. 149  Often, high-status (born into more noteworthy 
families) aristocrats would skip a few of the early offices and go 
straight to quaestor, tribune or a local magistrate, offices not far 
away from major roles that held imperium. 
 When off the battlefield, an aristocrat could still display 
virtus. This more philosophical ideal of virtus included loyalty to 
the Roman state and “general excellence” as described previously. 
Competency in their role in public office, an accumulation of 
wealth, or even just a prestigious family name could contribute to 
the Senate’s consideration of an aristocrat’s virtus. Examples from 
later Roman literature display these trends; such as Cicero’s claims 
that Cato had virtus more for his public and administrative deeds 
                                                          
148 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 172. 
149 McCall, The Cavalry, 85. 
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than for his military successes. 150  Likewise, even later 
commentators, such as Seneca, claimed that Cicero should be 
commended for having superior virtus, though he had no military 
successes to speak of.151 
 
V. Virtus and Imperium 
 Eventually the Roman aristocrat would achieve a 
successful military career, a productive decade in public offices, 
become a praetor, consul or dictator, and receive the Roman power 
of imperium. Once imperium was achieved, the definition of virtus 
in such a man with imperium changed immensely. In fact, the 
meaning of virtus itself changed frequently depending on the man 
with imperium and his degree of success. From roughly 390 BC to 
the Punic Wars, the Romans preferred an offensive foreign policy 
due to a national paranoia that took hold after the Gallic sack of 
Rome in 390 BC.152 
 The case of the Dictator Fabius Maximus perhaps best 
exemplifies this view of virtus. During the Second Punic War, 
Hannibal of Carthage invaded the Italian peninsula and managed to 
penetrate deep into the Roman lands of Latium, Campania, 
                                                          
150 Cicero, The Orations, 12. 
151 Gary D. Farney, Ethnic Identity and Aristocratic Competition in Republican 
Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 225. 
152 Veit Rosenberger, “The Gallic Disaster,” The Classical World 96, No. 4 
(2003): 365. 
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Samnium, and other southern Italian regions.153 The Romans sent 
out their consuls and praetors, the first line of Republican military 
defenses, and their armies in an attempt to stop Hannibal from 
burning the Italian countryside. These consuls and praetors acted 
with the standard meaning of virtus during the time: aggressive 
attacking strategies, despite tactical disadvantages and numerical 
inferiority.154 Their rash actions, done in an attempt to prove their 
virtus, led to the disastrous battle at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC.155 
 Lake Trasimene represented one of the most catastrophic 
defeats in Roman history up to that point. The Roman Consul 
Flaminius went up against Hannibal’s forces with a small consular 
army when Hannibal invaded Etruria in 217. Hannibal knew that 
the Roman generals were culturally expected to act aggressively, 
and so he moved his army around the fortified Roman position and 
instigated a fight south of Flaminius’ favored ground.156 Flaminius, 
attempting to avoid looking like a coward, advanced quickly to 
meet Hannibal’s numerically superior forces, at an area around 
Lake Trasimene. As Flaminius advanced, “No sort of 
reconnaissance” was performed, according to Livy, which was an 
unnecessarily risky maneuver.157 Flaminius was overconfident in 
his presumed victory, and a poorly calculated attack (if successful) 
                                                          
153 Adrian Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage (London: Phoenix, 2000), 167. 
154 Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts, 200. 
155 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 181. 
156 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 185. 
157 Livy, The War With Hannibal, translated by Aubrey de Selincourt (New 
York: Penguin Group, 1972), Book XXII, section 4, 98. 
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would not only greatly boost his political career and reputation, but 
would also display his virtus as well. 
 Unfortunately, Hannibal expected the Roman consul to act 
in an overly aggressive and rash manner. His army had hidden in 
wait on the hillside, and when the Romans marched past, he 
signaled his troops to attack. Livy describes the outcome best: 
“Down they came from the hills, each many by the nearest way, 
taking the Romans totally unprepared.”158 This battle resulted in 
the entirety of the consular army being enslaved, killed, or 
otherwise disbanded, as well as the death of consul Flaminius 
himself.159 
 In response to this catastrophic loss, the Roman Senate 
elected Fabius Maximus as Dictator. With a dictator in charge, all 
other positions that normally held imperium, such as the praetors 
and consuls, had to give their armies over to the dictator, who had 
supreme military control. Fabius had previously held the 
consulship three times, and had military prestige from his victories 
over the Ligurians in the 230s. 160  The situation that Fabius 
presided over was very bleak. Roman morale was low due to 
repeated defeats and Carthaginian ravaging of the countryside, and 
his armies were incredibly fearful of engagement with the ever-
                                                          
158 Ibid. 
159 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 188. 
160 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 191. 
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victorious Hannibal.161 
 In order to raise his soldiers’ morale, Fabius chose a new 
strategy in waging the war. Instead of following Hannibal and 
attempting a direct confrontation, he chose merely to shadow 
Hannibal and perform minor assaults on the Carthaginian baggage 
train and light infantry. Polybius claims Fabius wished to “incur no 
danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men 
his first and greatest object.”162 For a few months, this strategy 
worked quite well. The morale of both the army and the Senate 
rose quickly while under Fabius’ leadership.163 
 Unfortunately, while the Romans suffered no major defeats 
with Fabius’ strategy, the Senate and Fabius’ subordinates did not 
see any massive victories either. The Master of Horse, Fabius’ 
second in command named Minucius, believed that Fabius had 
become too timid, and so he began leading small bands of troops 
into direct conflict with Hannibal’s army. Minucius, according to 
Livy, established the meaning of virtus as it pertained to him and 
the Senate: “Rome’s power grew by action and daring – not by 
these do-nothing tactics, which the faint-hearted call caution.”164 
 In conjunction with Minucius’ denouncement of Fabius, the 
Senate and army showed their displeasure as well. While the 
                                                          
161 Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXII, section 14, 110. 
162 Polybius, Histories, translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (New York: 
Macmillan, 1889), Book III, section 89, 146. 
163 Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXII, section 15, 111. 
164 Ibid. 
97 
 
Senate merely berated Fabius, his army was highly mutinous and 
did not follow Fabius’ orders.165 In fact, it seemed that “Had the 
matter been put to a general vote, there is little doubt that the army 
would have declared a preference to serve under Minucius rather 
than Fabius.”166 Fabius was seen as cowardly precisely because he 
was attempting to protect his army from destruction, rather than 
aggressively pursuing the enemy as previous generations had done 
to grow “Rome’s power.”167 
 As a result, when Fabius’ term as dictator ended, he was 
not asked to return in any form to an office with imperium, and he 
retired in relative disgrace compared to how most at least partially-
successful generals did. 168  Immediately after, two new consuls 
were assigned to lead the Roman armies in a more aggressive 
strike at Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae occurred, resulting in the 
total annihilation of the Roman military yet again.169 The Senate 
received their wish of two imperium-wielding generals that 
exhibited the aggressive aspects of virtus, and their reward was 
another catastrophic loss. 
VI. A Fluid Virtus 
 The Roman army had been defeated handily at Lake 
Trasimene and Cannae. Further defeats, caused by the aggressive 
                                                          
165 Ibid., Book XXII, section 14, 109. 
166 Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXII, section 15, 111. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts, 202. 
169 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 197. 
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and rash decisions of Roman generals wishing to prove their virtus, 
were still to come. Eventually, though, the Senate learned its 
lesson. Fabius Maximus was brought out of retirement, and 
entrusted with the task of keeping Rome’s morale high, as well as 
orchestrating any necessary defense of the city. 170  For the 
remainder of the conflict with Hannibal, a more cautious strategy 
was allowed, and even the Roman soldiers accepted such 
leadership without mutiny. Fabius himself gained “the reputation 
of an outstanding commander” and was loved by his 
contemporaries as well as future Romans.171 
 This shift represented a large change in Roman military 
culture. Up to the time of Fabius, preemptive strike and an 
aggressive military stance had been the normal mode of virtus for 
Roman generals. 172  Modern scholars, such as Lendon and 
McDonnell, contend that the aggressive virtus continued full-force 
past this point, all the way up to Augustus and the tragedy with 
Varus and his legions along the Rhine. 173  The Senate and 
aristocratic conceptions of virtus, however, seem to have been 
more pragmatic than that. 
 Not only was the Senate willing to allow a massive shift in 
military policy after the relative success of Fabius’ strategy, future 
                                                          
170 Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXIII, section 21, 194. 
171 Frontinus, Stratagems, in Campbell, Brian, edit., Greek and Roman Military 
Writers (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.3.3, 118. 
172 Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts, 201. 
173 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 385-386. 
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strategic decisions of its like were also allowed. 174  The Senate 
praised future generals, not only for their aggressiveness if they 
had that trait, but also for their shrewd cunning in achieving 
victory. Frontinus remarks that the Senate “turned back to Fabius 
and his strategy” numerous times after the Punic Wars.175 
 By the time of the early Principate, there was certainly 
admiration for generals who used more strategic means to achieve 
victory. Livy claims that Fabius used “wise delaying tactics” and 
further criticized the Senate and soldiers under Fabius for having 
ever held “contempt” for their commander.176 Suetonius, a Roman 
biographer of the middle Principate, credited Augustus with 
saying, “a cautious general is better than a bold one.”177 While 
Suetonius’ comment would not necessarily represent what was 
thought during the early Principate/Late Republic, it at least shows 
that by the time of the second century A.D. there was a significant 
cultural shift in seeing virtus more as a path to victory, regardless 
of exactly which path is taken, rather than a specific virtue. 
 The alternative view of many scholars focused on the 
rigidly aggressive and martial courage definitions of virtus, such as 
McDonnell, is that, by the time of the Principate, virtus had lost 
most of its original meaning due to Greek influences and 
                                                          
174 Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 196. 
175 Frontinus, Stratagems, 8.14.1, 140. 
176 Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXII, section 22, 120. 
177 Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, in Campbell, Brian, edit., Greek and Roman 
Military Writers (New York: Routledge, 2004), 25.4, 80. 
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Augustus’ redefinitions of certain Roman cultural terms in order to 
benefit himself.178 This argument, however valid in explaining the 
imperial definitions of virtus, does not explain the Senate’s 
willingness to allow and actively promote the use of non-
aggressive tactics and strategies in the wake of the Second Punic 
War. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Myles McDonnell finishes his book, Roman Manliness: 
Virtus and the Roman Republic, with a short section on virtus in 
the Principate. In this section, he claims that the Romans of this 
period “could use both the martial and ethical meanings of virtus 
frequently and naturally.”179 By this time, virtus was a descriptor 
given to those who achieved success in any major part of Roman 
society, whether economic, political, military, or even religious.180 
McDonnell argues that this change happened swiftly, with 
Augustus having instituted most of the changes to the word virtus 
and its public perception between the end of the Republic and the 
first century AD.181 McDonnell also argues, earlier in the book, 
that men such as Cicero (from the late Republic) believed that 
virtus was the main quality “responsible for Roman greatness,” and 
that this quality had aspects in the military, political, and economic 
                                                          
178 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 385. 
179 Ibid., 386. 
180 Ibid., 386. 
181 Ibid., 385. 
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sections of Roman society.182 
 By the very nature of McDonnell’s argument and Cicero’s 
belief that virtus was how the Romans expanded their control over 
the Mediterranean, virtus had no single, static meaning. The 
Romans had not extended their territorial empire across the 
Mediterranean world simply through aggression and martial 
courage, but with a myriad of resources including diplomacy, 
wealth, and adept leadership. In fact, from the view of Cicero, 
virtus may as well have been defined simply as “Roman 
greatness.”183 
 Modern scholars’ attempts to define virtus as a strictly 
military word, and, worse, as a strictly military word with only a 
single military definition, come from a modern wish to translate 
words into easy, exact definitions. In order to translate virtus, 
however, the context the word is used in ends up far more 
important than the word itself. Roman generals had virtus in the 
early Republic due to their aggressive tactics that their enemies 
simply could not handle. During the latter years of the Second 
Punic War, Fabius had virtus due to his successful policy of 
cautious, periodic combat. Cato’s land had virtus, because a good 
harvest could come from its dirt. Plautus’ slaves had virtus, 
because they embodied the ideal Roman slave. 
 Virtus defined those who attained victory and success. It 
                                                          
182 McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 2. 
183 Ibid., 2. 
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was not that one man had distinct “martial courage,” and hence had 
virtus, because those who exhibited such a virtue and died had no 
virtus, such as those consuls who recklessly lost their own lives 
and those of their men at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. There was a 
definition of virtus that was popular among the lower classes, as 
exemplified by Fabius’ mutinous soldiers who wanted only an 
aggressive general such as Minucius, but this definition was just as 
fluid as the more generalized usage used at the higher levels of 
Roman society. The ideas of the aristocracy seem to have trickled 
down to the lower classes, as mutinies became less common over 
the years and there seems to have been a general acceptance that 
the general’s orders were to be followed regardless of moral issues 
surrounding aggression and virtus.184 
 McDonnell’s argument about the homogenization of the 
term virtus during the Principate is certainly valid. The 
homogenized use of virtus, however, had existed for much longer 
than that. And before the homogenization of usage of the word, 
which can be dated to the late Republican writers, the term itself 
was fluid with its meaning. From defining the fertility of land to 
the excellence of slaves to the martial courage of soldiers, virtus 
was the primary word the Romans used to describe anything they 
found to be successful or generally positive. If sources existed in a 
more vernacular version of Latin, it is likely that virtus may have 
                                                          
184 Adrian Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman 
Empire (London: Phoenix, 2004), 128. 
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even shown up as a more or less synonym of the modern English 
word “successful.” Unfortunately, without such a source to 
analyze, the numerous shifting usages of virtus in the Latin lexicon 
leave the scholar with only one real conclusion: virtus represented 
“Roman excellence,” and had no single translation at any one time 
in Roman history. 
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